

Mozambique peace process bulletin

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Peace process stalled

The Mozambican peace process ground to a virtual halt in early March, and no serious movement seems likely until mid-May. The cease-fire continues to hold. UN troops are finally arriving. A draft election law is being presented to the parties. But the cease-fire and control commissions have stopped working and the other commissions never began functioning.

"There has been little progress" in moving the two sides' forces to assembly points, and in demobilisation, although this is "crucial" to the peace accord, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said in a report to the Security Council on 3 April.

Publicly, officials of ONUMOZ, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, say the delays are not serious. "There is no crisis. Time has not been wasted," said Dr Aldo Ajello, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, on 5 April. In private, however, ONUMOZ officials talk of "paralysis", a "boycott", an "impasse", and "hitting a brick wall".

The Italian ambassador, Manfredo di Camerana, who was close to the Rome negotiations, commented that "after six months, we are still at the beginning".

Renamo withdrew from the only two functioning commissions in the first week of March; most of its officials left Maputo on 9 March and had not returned by late April.

This has blocked the investigation of allegations of cease fire violations, prevented the selection and creation of assembly points, and limited food aid distribution because new roads could not be selected for demining.

"Renamo underestimated the number and quality of people needed," Ajello said. Therefore Renamo has selected 45 people (apparently supporters from urban areas, notably Beira and Quelimane) and sent them to its Maringue headquarters for a month-long seminar. Renamo officials already part of commissions were involved in the training, and there has been some

foreign assistance in this seminar, according to ONUMOZ officials.

In an interview with the Maputo daily Noticias, Ajello forecast that Renamo would return to the commissions before the end of March. Then after a five hour interview with Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama in Maringue on 31 March, Ajello said Dhlakama told him that these people were ready to come to Maputo and would be sufficient to staff all of the commissions. Commissions would resume work "within days", probably before 10 April, Ajello said.

But by late April this had not occurred. Dhlakama was due to begin a tour of Europe in late April and it seems unlikely that there will be any movement until he returns to Mozambique. Renamo officials say the 45 cannot come to Maputo until they have proper houses and salaries, causing more delay. Even if commissions resumed work in early May, the first assembly points would not be ready until late June -- eight months after the signing of the Rome accord -- and concentration of forces would not be complete until September. Demobilisation of soldiers could not start until July, and would continue into 1994. Voting would not be until June or probably October 1994.

There had been general acceptance of Afonso Dhlakama's repeated statements that he will not return to war, and that the peace process is irreversible. But on 15 April in a speech in Chimoio, President Joaquim Chissano accused Renamo of bringing in arms via Malawi and of resuming military training.

And fears are growing that even if fighting does not resume, the peace process could drag out over several years.

Election law tabled

A draft electoral law was distributed to political parties including Renamo at a meeting on 26 March. It will be

broadly acceptable, the government hopes to hold a special parliament session in May to consider the election law and companion laws on access to radio and on international observers. An election commission could then be named in June. Offices are already being rehabilitated for the commission.

Under the draft law, the president must receive a majority of valid votes (not counting blanks and nulls). If no one gains a majority, then there is a second round between the top two candidates, 21 days after the results are announced.

A parliament of 250 members will be elected on a provincial basis, with seats assigned in proportion to registered voters. Election will be on the basis of provincial party lists. There will be a 5% threshold in each province, rather than nationally, as called for in the peace accord. Thus MPs from each province will be assigned proportionately to those parties gaining more than 5% of the vote in that province.

The draft law requires each person to register at a particular polling station and to vote at that same polling station, but this is likely to be contentious because of the large movements of people expected over the next year. In Angola, people with registration cards were able to vote anywhere. Some parties may propose that people be allowed to vote anywhere in the same province in which they registered, since MPs are elected on a province-wide basis.

Voting and counting procedures will be the same as in Angola. Each polling station will serve about 1000 voters and will have a staff of five people, who must read and write Portuguese and of whom at least one must speak the local language. Each party has the right to name poll watchers (party delegates, delegados de listas) for each polling station.

Votes will be counted at each polling station as soon as the poll closes, in the presence of the party delegates who must sign the record of the count.

As in Angola, voters will have to dip a finger in indelible ink. Only the physically disabled will be allowed assistance in the polling booth.

Political propaganda will not be permitted within 500 metres of polling stations; armed soldiers must keep 100 metres away.

The law bans parties from accepting money from foreign governments, but permits them to take money from foreign and national non-government organisations.

UN: troops arrive

The 1043 Italian troops were in place along the Beira corridor by the beginning of April. Zimbabwean troops guarding the corridor withdrew after a ceremony in Chimoio on 15 April with Presidents Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.

The Italians are self-sufficient, with more than 500 road vehicles, 17 helicopters and three aircraft.

An infantry battalion of 743 men from Botswana arrived in April to begin guarding the Tete corridor. A Bangladesh battalion will guard with Nacala corridor; 25 men had arrived by mid-April. Zambia has

and India will provide logistic support. Uruguay will send a battalion to protect the main highway from Maputo to Inhambane, and a few men have arrived. Portugal is sending a communications battalion to link the rest of the UN troops and Argentina has promised a medical unit. ONUMOZ hopes that most troops will be in place by the end of May. Of a planned 378 unarmed military observers, 154 are now in place. They come from 12 countries.

Money, staff delayed

ONUMOZ has been plagued by delays within the UN system; six months after the cease-fire the ONUMOZ office was not fully operational. It took three months after the cease-fire and appointment of Ajello for the Security Council to agree to ONUMOZ and another three months, until 15 March, for the UN to approve an initial budget of \$140 million for the period through 30 June 1993. The Secretary General in his report complained that "only a relatively limited advance of \$US 9.5 million was made available pending approval of the whole budget," which meant that purchase of equipment, leasing of aircraft and office space, and the "timely recruitment and deployment of many key personnel" had to be delayed.

This delay results from both internal UN and international reasons. Mozambique is a low priority compared to Yugoslavia and Somalia, which means it gets pushed to the bottom of the list.

UN insiders in New York also point to confusion over the position of James Jonah, who was not sure he was to be reappointed as Under Secretary General. Ajello was initially named "interim" special representative because Jonah was said to want the post if he was not reappointed USG, in which case he would want to appoint his own personnel, so budget and staffing in Maputo were delayed. When Jonah was confirmed as USG in February, Ajello was made permanent. He was able to name more ONUMOZ staff, and a budget was eventually agreed.

The delay in getting ONUMOZ into effective operation has been widely criticised in the diplomatic community. This is seen as the single most important factor in the paralysis of the peace process because UN delays meant the parties to the accord were not under pressure to move forward.

Renamo: areas still closed

Renamo continues to "obstruct the freedom of movement of people and goods foreseen in the general peace agreement," Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council on 3 April.

Government and UN officials have not yet gained access to Renamo areas, and in some cases people are being prevented from leaving. A person injured by a mine was not allowed to be evacuated to a government hospital, even though a non-government organisation (NGO) had arranged a plane.

NGOs and press have been allowed access to

Renamo officials have asked for food and other assistance, but insisted on distributing it themselves without supervision.

Italian ambassador di Camerana accepts that "Renamo cannot allow government people to go to its areas now. All Renamo districts have a displaced administrator. If an area is opened, the government-appointed administrator will return." So Renamo may allow access only after the civil administration commission has started to function and agreed administrators have been named.

He also argues that Renamo is "confused". "Renamo thinks if a government health team goes to Maringue, it arrives there as Frelimo first and a doctor second. We must convince Dhlakama that a doctor is always a doctor first."

Meanwhile, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) is quietly removing Renamo's child soldiers and returning them home. This could make it easier from Renamo to open its areas.

So far, however, nothing is being done about women who were abducted and raped, and who now have families on both sides.

\$15 mn before demobilising

"Not one Renamo soldier will be sent to an assembly point unless we receive the money we have been promised," Dhlakama told the Portuguese news agency LUSA on 4 April. "Renamo's financial problems threaten democracy in Mozambique."

Money is only one of Renamo's new pre-conditions for demobilisation. The others involve UN troops, housing and a meeting with Chissano.

Dhlakama was referring to a supposed secret accord signed by the Mozambique government, Renamo and Italy on 16 December at the Rome donors conference. It said that Italy would try to arrange that \$32 million of the money pledged would go to the parties in the forthcoming election, and of that \$15 million would go to Renamo. Francisco Madeira, diplomatic assessor to Chissano, denied any knowledge of the accord. But diplomatic sources confirm that such a deal was made.

Renamo argues that it needs the money to transform itself from a guerrilla movement into an effective political party. There is no promise of money in the Rome peace accord, although there were rumours at the time that Renamo was given secret promises by the Italian government.

Italy signed the 16 December secret deal without consulting other donors, which it assumed would pay. For two months Ajello has been urging donors to contribute, and his visit to Italy in early April was in part to put pressure on his own government to provide funds, he said. But growing corruption scandals there will make it difficult for Italy to give more money to Renamo. UN officials are hopeful that other European Community governments will pay. The United States and Nordic governments have already refused.

It is proposed that the money be put into a special UN trust fund, which would be doled out for specific

salaries. The final amount would be given only after Renamo accepted the outcome of the election.

Some of the money would be used to establish an independent radio station.

ONUMOZ officials claim money is Dhlakama's main sticking point, and once most of the \$15 million is guaranteed Renamo will return to the commissions. "Dhlakama will play ball -- for a price," said one top ONUMOZ official. Some diplomats support this. And Ajello points out that as ONUMOZ is now costing nearly \$1 million per day, \$15 million for Renamo will save money if it gets the process moving.

Some donors say Dhlakama will accept as little as \$3-5 million, but this seems unlikely. Others fear Renamo will continue to create new conditions outside the peace agreement.

Dhlakama is expected to tour Europe in late April to drum up support. Some EC diplomats in Maputo say they suggested to their governments to offer money on the strict condition that Renamo lives up to the accord, and in particular gives free access to its zones.

Renamo demands UN troops

In his report to the Security Council, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali said that Dhlakama had written to him on 7 January to say that he would not move troops to assembly points until 65% of UN troops were in Mozambique, and some were deployed in areas under Renamo control. This "obviously goes beyond the provisions of the general peace agreement," Boutros-Ghali comments, and it is "seriously affecting progress".

ONUMOZ officials note that two-thirds of the UN troops will be in place by early May, before any assembly points are ready, so this does not impose a practical problem. But there are two other difficulties.

First, Dhlakama seems to have increased his demand. On 9 April Renamo issued a press statement saying that Dhlakama had told a rally that day in Maringue that Renamo soldiers would be sent to assembly points only when *all* UN troops had arrived.

Second, according to the UN Secretary General, Dhlakama wants UN forces deployed in such a way as to "ensure stability in Renamo areas" and "guarantee that another party could not take advantage of the demobilisation of Renamo forces."

Meanwhile, the government argues that 7000 troops are not needed to protect transport corridors, which are in government controlled areas. Instead some should be go to Renamo areas, in part to guarantee freedom of movement.

Thus for different reasons the two sides agree, and ONUMOZ proposes that some of the 7000 troops be relabelled as "armed military observers", as distinct from the "unarmed military observers" watching the assembly points. The Secretary General said they would "provide additional patrols and observation outside assembly areas and transport corridors."

This would satisfy both the government and Renamo, but could cause further delays.

Renamo will not return to the commissions until it has what is considered adequate housing for the people needed to staff those commissions and to help turn Renamo into a party. It feels this was promised under Protocol III of the Accord, and the government has been widely criticised for not moving faster on housing.

However the renewed fighting in Angola has caused Renamo to reassess its position. It had been demanding substantial houses in Maputo, but it realised that most houses in Maputo are overlooked by blocks of flats. It would be easy for even a disgruntled individual to lob a mortar shell or hand grenade onto a house from an adjoining building.

Thus Renamo seems likely to accept the construction of a compound of prefabricated houses along the beach road, similar to ones already built for South Africa and Italy. Netherlands will provide some money; the first houses could be ready in less than a month. Such a compound could be large enough to house most Renamo staff. And it could be protected by its own police, as set out in the peace accord.

Meanwhile, Italy has decided that Dhlakama should have a house of presidential quality. "We are ready to build a house for him, to his requirements," said the Italian ambassador Manfredo di Camerana. Italian officials believe that Dhlakama will agree to live in temporary accommodation in Maputo while the house is under construction.

Presidents fail to meet

Dhlakama's final condition was another face-to-face meeting with Chissano, and Dhlakama asked the South African government to serve as an intermediary in setting up the meeting. Ajello, too, has been trying.

Renamo asked for the meeting in Chimoio when Chissano was there with Mugabe to mark the departure of the Zimbabwean troops. The government turned this down and proposed Maputo, which was rejected as unsafe by Renamo.

The government then proposed Lichinga in northern Niassa province as a compromise. Chissano waited there from 15 to 20 April, but Dhlakama did not show up. Vitor Anselmo, Renamo political representative in Maputo, said that as the government gave no reason for refusing to meet Dhlakama in Chimoio, Renamo saw no need to give a reason for not meeting in Lichinga.

Government: Status battle

Although Boutros-Ghali reserves his strongest criticism for Renamo and the UN's own bureaucracy, he also cites the failure of the government to sign a status-of-forces agreement as "a major problem". In his report, Boutros-Ghali says that the ONUMOZ military deployment needs "freedom of movement" in order to be effective, and this is not possible because it still must "provide advance information of all movement of United Nations military personnel."

"At the present time, the movement of United

Consequently, ONUMOZ is required to obtain authorisation for its flights; airport duties have to be paid; vehicles have to be registered locally, and local taxes and duties are levied in accordance with national practice. Difficulties are experienced in the operation on ONUMOZ-chartered aircraft."

"The United Nations is not asking for privileges, exemptions and immunities greater than those which are usually granted," the Secretary General says. And he adds that the budget does not include money for local taxes.

Issues of money will be resolved, but freedom of movement has become a major battle between the government and Ajello over sovereignty. After six years of heavy pressure from the World Bank, Mozambican government officials are now well trained to never allow exemptions from taxation. Indeed, foreign agencies are a major source of government revenue. But a compromise will be reached.

Ajello has already accepted a personal statement from Chissano that Mozambique is simply too poor to provide ONUMOZ with rent-free accommodation. At the suggestion of the government, the UN has gone to the private sector, and is renting the top five floors of the Hotel Rovuma from Protea of South Africa.

But freedom of movement is more complex. Ajello says he wants what the "UN enjoys everywhere it has peacekeeping forces." Government officials say that is the problem -- the UN is in Mozambique for observation and monitoring, not peacekeeping, and Ajello is trying to expand its mandate.

It is prepared to grant the unarmed observers free movement, but wants advance notice of larger troop deployments. It also wants advance notice of aircraft flights and of UN personnel and equipment entering and leaving the country.

The government argues that troop movements, and even inspections of cease-fire violations, come under the Cease-Fire Commission and are tripartite -- involving government, UN and Renamo.

Under the peace accord, the UN is not asked to do unilateral verification, and the government will not accept this. Indeed, the government says that the UN wants freedom of movement in part so that it can go into Renamo areas even if Renamo bars the government in violation of the peace accord, rather than forcing Renamo to follow the accord.

One very high Mozambican government source said that Ajello was acting like the head of an "occupation force" and asked if Africa was being "recolonised by way of the UN". Ajello is treating Mozambique like Somalia, like a country without a functioning government. "The UN can't just land troops on the beach here like it did in Somalia; they can't fly without telling the aviation authorities."

Indeed, the government alleges that the UN initially wanted to work without a status-of-forces accord, but the government demanded one. A draft was only presented by ONUMOZ in late February, and Ajello demanded it be signed by the end of March. The government said it needed time to consult ministries such as finance and transport, and only submitted its

Ajello was angry, and at a meeting in March he suggested to donors that they put pressure on Frelimo to sign the UN draft, perhaps by delaying aid. Most donors rejected the suggestion. But the US says it supports Ajello and his interpretation that this is a "peacekeeping" force. Ajello was due to meet with Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in Rome in mid-April and was going to ask him to put pressure on the Mozambique government.

There appears to have been a split between Ajello and di Camerana, however. The Italian ambassador said he backed the Mozambique government -- "the UN cannot have complete autonomy. This is not Yugoslavia or Somalia" -- and said he would lobby Boutros-Ghali to oppose Ajello's request.

The dispute also reflects the currently changing role of the UN. One ONUMOZ official pointed to a New York Times article (28 Mar 1993) which stressed that the UN "is moving towards greater interventionism". It is taking on an increasingly activist role and is increasingly willing to use force. The article notes this is because "no longer does a hostile Kremlin ... invoke the inviolability of national sovereignty as a reason for stopping western powers from acting."

Analysis: Who gains?

"The slow pace is not such a bad thing," commented a US embassy source. "We need time. We cannot solve these things quickly," said di Camerana.

Indeed, di Camerana suggests that the elections be delayed for a long time. "The best solution would be a government of national unity representing all political parties." This might be a "neutral government" with Chissano as head but with ministers "chosen on technical grounds."

Referring to *War and Peace*, Ajello told some staff members that he followed the strategy of Kutuzov rather than Napoleon. Kutuzov retreated from Moscow and waited for the winter to starve Napoleon's army. Ajello said he wants to wait in order to put pressure on the government over the status-of-forces agreement.

Most diplomatic observers argue that delays tend to benefit Renamo and harm Frelimo. Renamo is weak and needs time and money to turn itself into an effective political party; the government is now stronger but growing weaker over time.

Indeed, the position has been totally reversed since the Rome negotiations. Then, Renamo and its backers pushed to have it treated as an equal to the government and for the tightest possible timescale, with elections in just one year. Now emphasis is put on Renamo's weaknesses and the need for delay.

The UN Secretary General in his report said that "it is essential to have the necessary conditions to allow Renamo to assume a proper role in the political and social life of Mozambique. This is a serious problem which has to be resolved by Mozambicans as soon as possible, if the peace process is to succeed. I welcome the cooperative approach of various donor countries."

that Renamo is committed to peace and to transforming itself into a political party. But this will be much more difficult than was expected, because Renamo had been entirely a guerrilla force largely involved in destruction, so it has not developed staff with administrative and political experience. Thus large numbers of people will have to be found and trained if Renamo is to take an active part in the peace process and make a credible show in the elections.

Frelimo officials object, saying this was not part of the peace accord. One minister said: "to some people an effective transition to democracy only takes place when the governing party loses the election. When those people say they want to learn the lessons of Angola, they mean that they want to ensure the opposition wins. But beating Frelimo will take time, so they are slowing down the process."

One issue which will become more important in coming weeks is how much assistance can be given to Renamo, especially in its areas, before full access is allowed. Several countries have talked of training Renamo administrators and using NGOs to help Renamo establish health services independent of the government.

But who provides social services could be a real issue in the election. Indeed, Renamo attacks on schools and health posts were because Frelimo's main success was in provision of services. And Renamo will want to claim any restoration of these services.

Local government is next test

The next area of controversy and delay is likely to be about local administration. The peace accord says that "the relationship between the Ministry of State Administration and the administration in areas controlled by Renamo shall be conducted through a national commission," but Renamo has not named its representatives.

The accord says "public administration in the areas controlled by Renamo shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be members of Renamo." This is intentionally vague, leaving problems to the commission. It must set up an administrative structure and select (and perhaps train) people. Even with good will, this could take time. If negotiations are difficult, it will take many months.

The peace accord has many linked components, and some ONUMOZ officials fear this could delay other aspects. Until there are agreed administrators in place, Renamo may be unwilling to allow full access and give up military control of its zones. This could, in turn, delay the movement of troops to assembly points.

Military: No assembly points

No assembly points have been established yet because the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) is not functioning. Of the proposed 49 assembly points, 19 have been surveyed and 13 approved -- nine government and four Renamo.

Nothing more can be done because it requires

parties to do a full assessment of needs of each location, before site preparation can begin.

Ajello complains that both sides are choosing assembly points on strategic grounds, to try to control territory. He stressed that assembly points are for transit, not settlement. Of the first 19 proposed assembly points, three were rejected as totally inaccessible and two others will need to be moved. And there is one political dispute: Renamo proposed an assembly point in Salamanga, south of Maputo, which Frelimo says it rather than Renamo controls.

Once the CCF resumes meeting and gives its approval, the first assembly points could be ready in about six weeks, according to the Technical Unit for Demobilisation. The Unit had been set up under the government before the peace accord to plan demobilisation. It will be responsible for the civilian side of the assembly points: food, water, health and issuing documents. Transport home for soldiers and their families and personal belongings will be organised by the International Organisation for Migration. There will be a UN volunteer and an unarmed military observer in each camp.

Demobbed soldiers are also to receive civilian clothing. But only enough money is available to give them two pairs of trousers and two shirts, with no underwear, socks or shoes.

Officers with enough education, experience or money to successfully set up on the outside seem anxious to leave the army. But many others, especially those who have been in the army for many years and who have little education, have no role in the new army and face a bleak future in civilian life. They could cause problems; President Chissano is trying to create a loan fund for officers to encourage them to leave.

Help for pre-accord demob

Demonstrations and strikes are continuing as government soldiers, including the presidential guard in Maputo, demand back pay, extra pay and demobilisation money.

At the request of Chissano at a meeting on 1 April, Ajello agreed that the Technical Unit For Demobilisation could aid demobilisation of 16-24,000 government soldiers who received demobilisation notices between 1 January 1992 and the signing of the peace accord, but who are still with their units. Because these soldiers are not covered by the peace accord, ONUMOZ officials say this can be done by the UN independent of the non-meeting commissions.

Registration of eligible soldiers was due to start in Maputo by mid-April. The Unit hopes the first soldiers would be going home before the end of April and all could be sent home in two months. July is the earliest demobilisation could begin under the peace accord, and the Unit hopes that it will gain the experience to move smoothly into the process then.

Soldiers will be given back pay plus six months salary by joint brigades from the Ministries of Finance and Defence. This is a compromise following years of dispute which left many soldiers without pay.

drive away will be taken home with their families by hired lorries. A survey early last year of nearly 16,000 soldiers then scheduled for demobilisation showed that 58% will live in the same province where they are stationed. Nearly two thirds have wives and children to be transported home with them.

No army training yet

On 19 March Aldo Ajello announced that the first 100 soldiers for Mozambique's new army, 50 from each side, were to be trained by the British in Inyanga, Zimbabwe. Ajello thought he had agreement from Renamo, but it refused to provide the 50 troops -- apparently because it would have removed too many of Renamo's top officials from Mozambique. The government troops were ready.

This was to be a pilot course of 6-8 weeks to see the potential and standards of both sides.

But it now seems unlikely that any training will begin before July. Renamo has still not named its members to the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM).

Britain is to train the army. Portugal will train special forces and those providing administration and logistics. Portugal will also advise the navy and air force. France will support efforts by the other two.

Cease-Fire violations

The government accused Renamo of six cease-fire violations in February. This includes the training of more than 1000 Zimbabwean dissidents with the help of foreign white instructors, several movements of Renamo fighters and arms, the blocking of road rebuilding and the illegal import of an aeroplane. According to the local press, Renamo was cheated when it purchased the second-hand light aircraft for \$550,000 in Kenya. The plane has no documentation, not even logbooks or an airworthiness certificate, and is grounded in Maringue because of a faulty engine.

The violations have not been investigated because of the Renamo boycott of the CCF.

Meanwhile, Dhlakama has accused the government "transferring thousands and thousands of members of its armed forces into the police", although no formal complaint has been made. In his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General pointedly notes that it is the National Police Affairs Commission (Compol) which should investigate such complaints, but that it cannot do so because Renamo has failed to appoint members. It has also failed to name members to the other commissions called for in the accord, on reintegration (CORE) and the security services (Cominfo).

A demining subcommission of the CCF has been established. A private company has begun work on the road near Inhaminga, north of Beira, with Frelimo and Renamo observers present. A master plan for demining is now ready, but nothing can happen until the CCF resumes its meeting. The plan calls for a school to train up to 2000 people.