# peace process bulletin



Issue 6 - October 1993

To be published irregularly by AWEPA until the first multi-party elections in Mozambique

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### **Gloom descends on Maputo**

After arousing optimism during its leader's visit to Maputo, Renamo returned to painting grey on Mozambique's political canvas, making new demands and proposals considered unacceptable by both government and international observers.

The first anniversary of the signing of the General Peace Accord on 4 October 1992 was reached with the peace still holding -- but with no troops in assembly points, no demobilisation, little access to Renamocontrolled areas, and only limited progress toward elections which should have been held by the first anniversary but which have now been postponed to October 1994. Indeed, in an unexpected statement on 24 September Renamo proposed the holding of elections without first demobilising the forces of the two sides and without creating a joint army.

Great emphasis had been put on the muchdelayed summit meeting between President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama as a way of breaking the stalemate. But the summit failed to speed the stagnated peace process. Ten days of talks produced only limited results.

A 3 September agreement specified the appointment of three Renamo advisers to each governor, Renamo nomination of officials in areas under its control, and agreement on UN monitoring of the police.

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**EXCLUSIVE IN THIS ISSUE** 

Interview with Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama

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Returning to normal in Zambezia

 This was not enough. On a visit to Kenya on 9 September, Dhlakama stressed that the summit agreement did not mean Renamo would stop controlling movement in its areas, and that economic, political and social activities in its zones still require Renamo permission. On 11 September Raul Domingos, head of the Renamo team on the main peace commission (Supervision and Control -- CSC) said that nothing in the new agreement called for the opening of Renamo areas.

Domingos also stressed that the Mozambican constitution could not apply in Renamo areas until after an election. And he said there could be no further movement on territorial administration or demobilisation until after the disarming and demobilisation of various irregular forces and militias -a new demand on the part of Renamo.

He also renewed demands for uniforms and military equipment before Renamo soldiers go to assembly points. And Renamo continues to demand changes in the structure of the election commission set out in the peace accord.

Dhlakama, in an interview just after the summit, stressed Renamo's continued need for money. He also suggested a transitional government.

#### **UN prods Renamo**

The United Nations Security Council passed a sharply worded resolution on 13 September, clearly aimed at Renamo, "stressing the unacceptability of attempts to attach conditions to the peace process, in particular to the assembly and demobilisation of troops, or to gain more time for further concessions."

In his report to the Security Council, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that the government was ready to send troops to assembly areas "as soon as Renamo is prepared to do the same" but that Renamo will not demobilise until the

resolved.

The Security Council rejected this. Its resolution "urges Renamo to join the government of Mozambique in authorising immediate assembly of forces" followed by an immediate start to demobilisation.

The Security Council also "reaffirms the importance it attaches to the holding of elections no later the October 1994."

But Renamo's National Council at a meeting 24 September chaired by Dhlakama stressed again that before anything else happened, there must be UN supervision of the police and the demobilisation of private armies and militias.

It stressed its desire to hold elections in October 1994, and said it would do so "even without [adequate] financial conditions" although this might mean "participating in the electoral campaign on foot."

But in a new and surprising proposal, the National Council suggested elections before demobilisation. "It was Renamo's intention that the elections be held without there still being two armies, but considering that the situation is much delayed, Renamo is disposed to participate even with the two armies. At the same time, Renamo desires that the two armies should be confined to their bases and barracks in such a way as to not disturb the electoral process -- as has been the case up to now on the side of the Renamo forces."

Renamo head of intelligence services Mateus Ngonyamo later stressed that Renamo was still working toward demobilisation before the election, but the National Council suggestion seemed to underline the widely held view that Renamo is anxious not to demobilise.

Renamo again raised the spectre of Angola. The National Commission statement and earlier statements by officials warned of the need to prevent a return to war if the elections were not considered free and fair.

#### Hopeful on the ground

While anxiety grows in political circles about the paralysis in Mozambique's peace process, the grassroots view seems more encouraging.

Thousands of war-displaced people continue to venture home. In many areas, contact and even commerce between people in government and Renamo held areas is gradually opening up.

A monthly bulletin on the nation's nutritional status, compiled by Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), says in its last issue: "Nationwide, the food security situation can be described as stable and remarkably good, given the recent widespread hunger and dependence on food aid". Harvests in most parts of the country were good this year, due to decent rains and relative stability.

Many non-government organisations (NGOs) say their working relations are gradually improving with Renamo and that, in small ways, they are managing to bridge the gap between government and Renamo, for example by easing cooperation on health and education. areas, including its military bases. And it remains clear that a lasting return to normal life depends on soldiers from both sides being demobilised.

#### Chissano-Dhlakama summit

The two leaders met during 10 consecutive days from 23 August to 3 September. This was their first encounter on Mozambican soil and only the second since they signed the General Peace Accord on 4 October 1992.

The summit was to discuss three points: territorial administration, the police and the media. In all three areas, Renamo was pushing for government concessions substantially beyond those made as part of the peace accord. [Renamo's proposals and the final agreement are printed in full on page 8.]

The impasse on administration is now key, because Renamo will not demobilise until it is resolved. The two sides have widely differing interpretations of the peace accord. Renamo claims it explicitly recognises the existence of two administrations in the country, while the government argues the opposite. [The accord says that the laws of the government of Mozambique apply throughout the country and all citizens, including government officials, have the right to travel anywhere. This is detailed in issue 5 of the *Bulletin*.]

Chissano and Dhlakama accepted that governors remain the highest authority in the province, but that Renamo could name three "advisers" to each governor. Although the advisers will not be members of the government and the governor will determine the departments with which they will work, the advisers will have significant power. The advisers must be given information by the governor and provincial directors, they must give an opinion on all decisions taken by the governor relating to zones controlled by Renamo, and they have the right to refer issues to the yet to be established commission on state administration.

The advisers will be civil servants with salaries, houses, and cars. This gives Renamo is first formal place in government administration, and should help Renamo establish itself in provincial capitals.

Once the advisers are in place, Renamo will gain the right to nominate local officials in areas it controls. The peace accord only says that officials in areas now controlled by Renamo must be resident in those zones, so the agreement to allow Renamo to actually choose officials is a significant concession by government.

Renamo had proposed a much more radical alternative. It wanted to resolve the dispute by setting up an "Economic and Social Council" and, in effect, create an interim government headed by Chissano, Dhlakama, and the Prime Minister.

On the police question, Renamo continues its mistrust of the "Rapid Intervention Police" (or anti-riot police) and the transfer of government soldiers into the police force. It wanted to transfer control of the police to the new joint national army and immediately disband the anti-riot police. final agreement only calls for the UN to send an international police contingent to monitor the police. This is not in the peace accord, but had already been suggested by the UN. The contingent would also monitor private security companies.

Signing of the final agreement was delayed 24 hours due to disagreement on the third discussion point -- control of the media. Renamo wanted tighter control to ensure what it called greater neutrality in the state-owned media. The government refused, saying it saw no need for extra measures, as press freedom is guaranteed by the existing press laws and in the national constitution.

In a press conference following the summit, Dhlakama said "I'm not happy, but I'll continue with my mission and I'll bring up this problem again in my next meetings with President Chissano".

## **Exclusive interview:** Dhlakama satisfied

Shortly after sealing his agreement with President Joaquim Chissano, Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama told the *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* that he was fully satisfied with the outcome of the two leaders' first talks on Mozambican soil.

He said President Chissano's agreement to appoint three Renamo advisers in every province "is exactly what we wanted."

"The government has accepted Renamo advisers. Renamo will name three advisers for every provincial governor. I can say 'I want these three men in Sofala, these three men in Maputo'. And these advisers will have powers; they will limit all the games that the provincial governors played, especially in our zones".

The salaries, transport and other working facilities government promised to provide these advisers could go some way to solving what Renamo's president identified as a key problem for his group's transition from a "politico-military movement" into a political party.

"This transition is a hard task, because the means we need have changed. During the war, we could attack an enemy position and capture enough material. In this work of transition things have changed; we need offices, fax machines, finance. And the means we have are not sufficient. The only problem we have in transforming ourselves is this one, of resources".

For Dhlakama, the transition from military to political movement does not imply a change in his organisation's reputedly autocratic decision-making structure. "During the war, military and political decisions were always made in parallel. I am Commander in Chief, but I have also always been the leader, the President of Renamo, politically. Today, clearly, I work more with the politicians".

Dhlakama denied that all power rests in his hands, while other Renamo leaders have no decisionmaking authority. "It's not true. For example, my men without reporting to Gorongosa [Dhlakama's base]. By contrast, Frelimo men have 24 hour contact and consultations with the Head of State".

But he also stressed that "of course, any person must report to their leader".

Renamo's top man said he is disappointed with the international community. "During peace negotiations, in 1991/92, many countries, including England, France, Portugal and the United States promised that as soon as the peace accord was signed they would make money available for Renamo's transformation [into a political party]. That didn't happen. Italy is the only one who contributed money."

Dhlakama is also "disappointed" with Italy and with the United Nations administered trust fund which controls money being given to Renamo. "If Italy had given the money directly to us, we wouldn't be here dancing to the Trust Fund".

Despite Italy's financial support, however, Dhlakama said he has not taken political advice specifically from Italy. "When I last went to Europe, in May and June, many countries thought a transitional government would be a good way to unblock existing problems in Mozambique, but it is not true that specifically Italy advised us".

Dhlakama claimed that in general, his relations with the UN in Mozambique are good, and he repeated that "if Renamo loses the elections this time, it will have to accept being in the opposition".

But he added a warning: "The elections must be free and democratic, not like what happened in Angola". This is ominous, because international observers all judged the Angolan elections to be free and fair.

If Renamo loses the elections, Dhlakama said, finance will continue to be a major problem, and already it is doing its best "through foundations, friends, businessmen -- in any way -- so that Renamo has the minimum, at least, to survive as a political party".

If he were not in the political game, Dhlakama said "I'd like to work as a farmer, to have a little field with my family. in the morning my wife would fetch a tin of mapira [millet] or fetch flour for us to cook. I've struggled a lot for independence, that is the independence of a family in terms of food, which is a basic need in Africa".

#### Dhlakama eye-opener

During his 12 days in the capital, Afonso Dhlakama did not hide his emotion and surprise, especially at the welcome he was given.

About 3000 people waving Renamo posters and banners showed up to meet him at Maputo airport when he arrived on 21 August, for his first visit since in the war began. On his trips around Maputo, his armed guards and their Landrovers were allowed free passage, despite some exaggerated behaviour such as driving at high speed with guns pointed at everything in the middle of the public highways.

confessed to Chissano that he was surprised and that his men in Maputo had not kept him fully informed. Omissions included some of the documents and communiques the group's representatives in Maputo had signed.

Shortly before Dhlakama's arrival in Maputo, Renamo representatives in the capital took quite seriously false rumours that the government was preparing to mobilise thousands of women to go to the airport, dressed in mourning.

The meetings also showed a high level of mistrust and confusion within Renamo. For the Dhlakama/Chissano meeting and for the Multi-party Conference on the draft electoral law, Renamo brought both members and foreign advisers to Maputo. But Renamo sources complain that external interests directly influence its president, leaving its own leaders on the sidelines. "Inside Renamo everyone waits to hear what the president will say, then echo him, and as far as possible try to show they understand why things were decided in that way", a Renamo member said.

During his meetings with Chissano, Dhlakama adopted a tolerant and less aggressive tone in his public statements, but later returned to his harder line. One western diplomat in Maputo, after meeting both leaders, said "Dhlakama is somewhat in awe of President Chissano and, when they are alone together, the president finds it easy to convince Dhlakama. But when Dhlakama gets back to his advisers, everything changes again".

#### Italian differences

The two key Italians in Maputo, United Nations special representative Aldo Ajello and Italian ambassador Mandfredi Di Camerana, continue to argue. Di Camerana still thinks Ajello is putting too much pressure on Renamo and in an interview with the independent publication *Mediafax* regretted that "noone makes an effort to understand Renamo".

"The UN arrived here with traditional parameters for how to act, as applied in Cambodia, and Somalia, thinking they must reach elections by 1994. They ought to be more pragmatic", said Di Camerana.

#### **Renamo businesses?**

Well-placed sources within Renamo say that Renamo is starting to make contacts in South Africa with the aim of setting up timber and mining companies in areas under its control.

"The idea is to set up these companies and have other such economic commitments with certain people, and in the process of handing these areas over to government control, to demand respect for commitments Renamo assumed when it administered the zones", the source said. The government Multi-party Consultative Conference with opposition parties on a new election law collapsed again in September. The government then decided to submit its draft version of the law to "popular" debate, in a process similar to what it did in 1989-90 before introducing a new national constitution.

Justice Minister Ossumane Ali Dauto, who presided at the conference, declared it closed on 17 September after eight of the 12 unarmed opposition parties decided to abandon the meeting.

But a declaration read by Antonio Palange in the name of PALMO, UNAMO, SOL, PPPM, PADEMO, PANADE, PACODE, and PAFEMO noted that the eight did not want to be held responsible for "failure of the democratic process" in Mozambique. The eight asked the government to try and reach an understanding with Renamo on the future election law.

"We will find other mechanisms for consultation, not only with political parties but also with civil society", said Minister of State Administration Aguiar Mazula.

The conference ended without managing to get past the controversial article 16 on the composition of a National Elections Commission (CNE). Participants divided into two groups, one composed of the eight unarmed opposition parties supported by Renamo, and the Group of Four -- MONAMO, FUMO, PCN, and FAP -- with positions close to the government.

The proposal upheld by the Group of Eight and supported by Renamo was that the CNE should be composed of 21 members: seven from Renamo (the number established by the General Peace Accord), eight from the government and six from the unarmed opposition.

The government wants the CNE to be composed in such a way that Renamo and the unarmed opposition parties, together, cannot maintain a majority, which could create "obstacles" during the process of organising elections.

Ali Dauto told the *Domingo* Sunday newspaper he was already receiving contributions to the debate from civil society. "We have a team of experts working to organise these contributions", he said.

Dauto denied any possibility that the future election law would not take the viewpoints of opposition parties into account. "I know what the opposition thinks. They made their comments when they were still part of an homogeneous group, the Group of 12. In bilateral talks with Renamo, we will take all proposals put forward by the unarmed opposition into account".

Ali Dauto said that "everything will be done by 10 October."

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Some areas of Zambezia province have passed from government to Renamo control after the peace accord was signed -- not on the back of military operations, but on civilian movements.

Frelimo willingly admits it made a major political mistake in the early years of its rule (1970s), when it deposed and ostracised traditional chiefs -- usually known as *mambos* or *regulos*. These local leaders were appointed by the Portuguese colonists but usually from families of traditional leaders, so they often had local standing.

While making apologies for past errors, Frelimo is still looking for an acceptable role for regulos in modern government. But Renamo has always relied on such chiefs, who were the key link between civilians and Renamo soldiers. Regulos kept local order and Renamo now promises them power if it wins the next elections.

Zero locality in Mopeia district, Zambezia, was controlled by the government army at the time of the peace accord. But the soldiers returned to their base, and the area is now dominated by the regulo who simply returned home from another Renamo area, allowing Renamo to call Zero their zone.

In the Renamo controlled zone of Muagiua, Gurue district, northern Zambezia, *Chef da Zona* (headman of local Mambos) Bernando Tukutuku explains his relationship with Renamo: "My father was a headman before independence, but Frelimo turfed him out. Renamo put me in when they came here in 1981 and got rid of Frelimo's party men. One of my jobs is calling people to bring food for Renamo soldiers."

"Renamo's soldiers brought other people to Muagiua, from co-ops and collective farms where they suffered under Frelimo, and all our families had to support the new people. We get instructions from Renamo's administrator, who came in 1988.

"In wartime, we built things for Renamo soldiers, but that has stopped now, and we just give them food.

"When the war ended, Renamo said the strangers here could go, and people who fled from here, including some of my own family, have come back.

"I went to town myself and met the government people -- that's when I really knew the war was over," Tukutuku concludes.

#### Strains remain

Aid workers with many contacts in the field note a sense of strain between the former Renamo guerrilla fighters and a growing army of civilian staff -- many of them youngsters with more education and little experience of fighting. However Renamo's provincial political delegate for Zambezia, Adalberto Pereira, denies there is any tension between the military faction and the growing political wing of Renamo.

At the height of the war, Zambezia was one of the worst affected, strife-ridden provinces in the country. But one top Renamo official says the real fighting stopped long before the peace accord, in the late to tacit local agreements not to attack each other. The same source said "the war would have ended then, if it wasn't for pride".

Despite its troubled history, Zambezia is now the province where a UN presence is least felt. There is no UN military office in the provincial capital, no UN troops patrol any of the roads, and NGO's say there is little activity by the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Committee (UNOHAC).

In his 30 August report to the Security Council, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali noted that special envoy Aldo Ajello has "strongly recommended" the deployment of troops in Zambezia, but the Secretary General said only that he was "studying this proposal closely". Renamo's Pereira says it could be useful, to guard against trouble.

Meanwhile, only one short stretch of road in the province is considered dangerous, between Quelimane the nearest district capital of Nicoadala, where armed men have attacked several civilian vehicles. The unidentified attackers are thought to be linked to discontent veterans of the liberation war, who have a large settlement nearby.

#### NGOs bridge the gap

Renamo top brass maintain their ban on letting Government workers, including health and education staff, operate in their areas, even though most NGOs working in Renamo zones testify that the former rebels have virtually no qualified health staff or teachers.

Medical aid agencies say they cannot give out medical supplies of even a basic kind in many Renamo zones, since no one is qualified to use them.

But NGOs report that local attitudes are gradually easing. Under the NGO umbrella, government nurses have been allowed into Renamo held zones for an ongoing vaccination campaign. And there are signs that government teaching material, if not teaching staff, may also be allowed in to some areas.

#### Changing zones

NGO representatives in Zambezia say Renamo appears to be over-coming its initial reluctance to let people move out of areas under its control. One theory is that many people have moved back from town to rural homes in areas influenced by Renamo or by allied regulos, and thus Renamo no longer fears losing people before general elections are held.

Filemena, her four children, and brother Luca were captured by Renamo in 1986 -- Filemena near her home in Namacurra and the others at Mocuba, in Zambezia. They were all marched several hundred kilometres to Renamo's stronghold in Gorongosa, where they lived for five years, growing food which they often had to give the rebel soldiers.

Luca said "in 1991, everyone knew the war would soon be over, and Renamo allowed us to move nearer home, to Luabo" in southern Zambezia. In September they were finally released, and went by boat to Quelimane, the provincial capital, arriving without The DPCCN (the government's aid distribution body) gave capulanas (cloths) to the women, and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) gave them transport the rest of the way home.

Filemena was dropped by the roadside with her only surviving child, on a scrub plain somewhere near what she remembers as home. Armed only with her new capulana, a hoe, a few pots, and a registration card from IOM giving her the title to help from a local NGO, she stumbled off in search of long-lost relatives and friends.

#### Some not so keen to move

Despite a gradual opening up of the countryside, not everyone is keen to move. In Zambezia, it is rumoured locally that those going back into some Renamo zones are not allowed out. Many people who fled Renamo zones to government areas fear reprisals, as long as Renamo soldiers still carry arms.

These seem factors scaring people away from Nhamanjavire, a zone in Zambezia where Renamo has a military base and has so far refused to open the road. And in Mocuba, 780 displaced people are staying put, afraid to move back the 200 kilometres to Derre, where Renamo also has a military base.

In other cases, return is encouraged more by push than pull factors. In July, the greatest outflow of people from any Zambezia district occurred in Nicoadala, where 5000 people reportedly left.

In September, IOM took another truck load of 44 people from Nicoadala to Milange district, on the border with Malawi. The returnees had fond memories of their fertile birthplace which, they said, has land enough for everyone.

Yet their main reason for moving from Nicoadala, their home of several years, was basically one of no choice. Farmers who crowded into Quelimane during the war were returning, leaving the displaced people with nowhere to farm.

Some local government authorities seem eager to rid their own particular districts of burdensome refugees. In Mocuba, local officials agreed with Lugela district officials that 15,000 refugees from Renamo attacks on Lugela -- before and after the peace accord -- had no excuse for staying in Mocuba beyond September, and must move back.

Before the authorities could enforce their decision, the Egyptian company Pidico which has a cotton-growing concession on land occupied by Lugela refugees stepped in to clear the "trespassers" out. Although Pidico sources deny this, the case is confirmed by DPCCN in Mocuba and by journalists with Radio Mocambique.

#### Seeds and tools short

"Returnees can't be said to be living a normal life yet; they have no food reserves and face a critical shortage of seeds and tools," said Jean-Pierre Medaeto, an UNOHAC member working with the Zambezia Provincial Emergency Commission (CPE). which was heavy just after the peace accord, is slacking off. Medaeto suggests most rural people fled less than 50km -- to the nearest town. "I think most of these have gone back, except people whose original homes are near Renamo bases -- they are afraid to go".

People who moved a long way to get home, or arrived after February this year and thus could not plant, are considered most vulnerable. One of the biggest problems for emergency work, now, is that populations concentrated during the war are suddenly dispersed, making aid distribution more difficult.

For many families, the gruelling trek home is followed by another journey, in search of assistance. Abena Matanga, a 45-year-old woman, spent a week on the road with her family of eight. They were returning to Gurue from refuge in Malawi. Matanga, who fled from Renamo captivity, said "my house where I come from, in Muagiua, is destroyed. I had nothing to bring from Malawi, so I don't know how we'll make out -- we have only our fields". From Muagiua, she walked another day to Gurue town, to get help.

DPCCN Gurue representative Antonio Sadala said 300 to 400 returnees pass through his camp each month, looking for help with food, transport, seeds, tools and clothes. Although food stocks are generally adequate at least for the next couple of months, seeds and tools are in short supply.

The MSF nutrition bulletin points out that people "urgently" need seeds and tools, but distributions "are not sufficient, especially for the populations most in need, those recently resettled as well as those in Renamo zones".

Recent UNOHAC figures showed the biggest deficit in committed aid funds was for agriculture, with a shortfall of over US\$ 50 million.

#### Refugees: going home

Since the peace Accord was signed a year ago, UN figures for people in need of food aid suggest that over 1.5 million war displaced people may have moved home.

This figure can only be a guess. It depends on rough estimates of rural populations. And many families have a foot in two huts -- one in their area of origin and one in their place of refuge, as they make a gradual or partial transition.

Sam Barnes of the UN Humanitarian Assistance Committee (UNOHAC) says "it will probably be at least a year before we have a clear picture of how many displaced people have gone home -- after they're properly re-settled".

Lack of transport has been identified by NGOs as one major factor still hindering resettlement, especially of people who fled the country or were forced to move a long distance.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is in Mozambique to transport home demobilised soldiers, but until that begins, it is moving displaced people. But IOM officials say many people are clamouring for transport to get home before the end of

move them all in time.

#### Slow move from Malawi

Contrary to predictions by international aid agencies, the return of refugees from Malawi (host to over one million Mozambicans) has slowed dramatically since July, for reasons the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Maputo says are "very difficult to pin-point".

A compilation of UNHCR and MSF figures suggest that 335,000 refugees had returned from Malawi by the end of July -- to Tete, Zambezia and Niassa provinces. Most of these returned from noncamp areas in central Malawi where Mozambicans lived integrated with the general population. But refugees in camps to the south have shown few signs of budging.

MSF reports that refugees give four key reasons for not wanting to return: that they are waiting for a clear signal that peace has been truly achieved and Mozambique is ready for them to go home; lack of transport; the existence of land-mines; and lack of basic services in Mozambique compared to Malawi camps, where services and food distributions are well organised.

In Mutarara, a key entry point to Tete, many areas are still mined, potable water is in short supply, sanitation is poor and food and other services hard to supply while important access roads remain closed.

Other factors are also deterring return from Malawi. On the border with Zambezia, armed groups are said to harass returnees, robbing their belongings. Recent instability in Tete, where several cease-fire violations were reported, may be a consideration. And there is little pressure from Malawi for refugees to move, in contrast to other neighbouring host countries, as Malawi still benefits from aid to refugees. MSF reports that in the Malawi refugee camps of Mwanza and Chikwakwa, new schools, health facilities and water services were built this year.

#### South Africa break-through

On 6 September, the UNHCR sealed a breakthrough accord with the South African government, which until then had refused to let it work with any refugees in the country except returning refugee South Africans.

South Africa did not legally recognise refugees from neighbouring countries -- principally Mozambique -- and simply classed them as "illegal immigrants".

Under the new agreement, UNHCR is allowed to register and assess the situation of foreign national refugees, thus implicitly giving them legal status as refugees for the first time in South Africa. This process is designed to ease the path towards their formally organised repatriation.

At the end of September, a UNHCR spokesman in Maputo said assessment and registration of the refugees in South Africa would start "within days", and organised repatriation was due to begin, at the earliest, in April 1994. country, as they have done for decades, seeking jobs in South Africa.

Meanwhile the first official UNHCR repatriation, of 513 of the 24,000 Mozambicans who took refuge in Swaziland, is due on 13 October. A tiny trickle of returnees continues from Zimbabwe (with an estimated 137,000 refugees, down by 3000 since October 1992) and from Zambia.

#### Suffer the children

Efforts to deal with the infamous, but silenced, problem of child soldiers, servants and orphans held in Renamo zones seems to have suffered a reversal.

Soon after the peace accord, hundreds of children were allowed out of Renamo zones and Renamo commanders seemed open to Red Cross and NGO "child tracing" programmes designed to help lost children find their families -- or at least surviving relatives.

In Nampula, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) registered 103 children in Renamo's military base at Namige, and the local commander allowed 30 of them out to be re-united with their families.

Suddenly the commander got cold feet or counter-orders, and stopped the ICRC evacuations, although he said that families of the registered children could come in and fetch them.

Lost and orphaned children are still coming into towns alone, for example in Tete, Zambezia, Inhambane and Maputo provinces. But Renamo is blocking organised efforts to identify and re-unite such children with their families.

A reliable source says the ICRC persuaded Renamo to set up an orphanage in Marringue, and bring children in, for later evacuation. According to the source, Dhlakama said the children who left were being used for "anti-Renamo propaganda", and he put a stop to the process.

The Mozambican Red Cross (CVM) in Zambezia was allowed to make a list of 200 lost children in Renamo zones, but Renamo has refused permission either to let CVM take them out or for their families to come and fetch them.

The government welfare body, Accao Social, says Renamo proposed that for every child taken out of their zones, another one should be brought in. Renamo has refused entry to Accao Social, which runs the national family tracing programme. One official said: "Naturally they're ashamed of the child soldiers, and will never admit to having them".

A girl and boy, eight and twelve years old, arrived in the government held town of Gurue, northern Zambezia, in mid-September, their feet inflamed after three days walk from Macringa, the Renamo base where they lived as servants. They told how they were captured and taken to Macringa, their parents were murdered, and they were put to work, grinding maize, fetching water and firewood, and doing other chores, for Renamo families, until September. Suddenly they were told: "The war is over, so you have to go". They

mud, dressed only in tree bark, knowing no one.

The local representative of Accao Social, Augosto Saroa, says straight after the peace accord, Gurue received 74 children from Renamo zones, most of them orphans. This year, only 15 more have come.

Renamo's leaders now deny that they ever used child soldiers or servants, despite volumes of evidence collected by international human rights organisations, NGOs and researchers. Some political observers suggest the embarrassing problem over what to do with their child soldiers is one factor behind Renamo's continued refusal to start demobilisation.

#### Documents

(unofficial translations)

### Chissano-Dhlakama 3 September agreements

After ten days of summit talks between President Chissano and Renamo's president, including plenary sessions with restricted delegations from both parties and a meeting with all provincial governors and Renamo's provincial delegates, two agreements were reached:

#### Territorial administration agreement

1 - The government will, within the provincial state apparatus, create the post of "advisers" to the governor, with the role of advising the governor on all matters to do with or directly or indirectly involving zones under Renamo control, including social and economic matters.

2 - In each province, the government will name three members, presented by Renamo, to the post of "advisers".

3 - Whenever there is legal cause, the advisers may be dismissed by the government, in agreement with Renamo. The government will agree to dismissal whenever Renamo asks for this. In either case, Renamo may present other people to replace the dismissed advisers, in terms of number two of the present document.

4 - According to needs and tasks, the governor will indicate case by case which director or directors the advisers should work with.

5 - The provincial directors should give the advisers all the co-operation needed for them to properly exercise their functions.

6 - The advisers may, whenever they find convenient, suggest initiatives, measures or furnish opinions for consideration by the provincial governor.

7 - All the decisions relating to zones controlled by Renamo shall be taken after the adviser has given their opinion, which should be given within the period indicated by the governor, or within a reasonable period considering the circumstances.

8 - Decisions on matters related to zones under Renamo control which fall under the competence of central government should be taken after hearing the 9 - The advisers are not members of the government. They are civil servants with the specific task as defined above.

10 - Situations arising in the exercise of their job as advisers and which cannot be resolved with the provincial governor or with the central government, shall be referred to the National Administration Commission for consideration and decision.

11 - When all the advisers to provincial governors are already working, the government will name officials put forward by Renamo from among the residents in zones under its control.

12 - The advisers shall enjoy the following rights:

- salaries and benefits corresponding to letter 'E' of the existing salary scale in the state apparatus.

- transport for the exercise of their duties.

- they shall be provided a house to rent

13 - The government guarantees the advisers the necessary work conditions for carrying out their jobs well.

#### Police agreement

1 - The parties agree to ask the United Nations to send a police contingent to monitor all police in the country, namely the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) and others, as well as respect for citizens' rights and freedoms, and to give technical assistance to COMPOL [the joint commission to oversee the police].

2 - This contingent would also have the mission of checking that the activity of private protection and security companies develops within the terms of the peace accord.

#### Renamo Proposals

Documents apparently belonging to Renamo, and containing its suggested solutions to the points discussed by presidents Chissano and Dhlakama, have circulated in Maputo. The documents were apparently prepared for the summit meeting.

#### Territorial administration proposal

Renamo speaks of resolving the administration issue by setting up a Council: "The need is seen to create an Economic and Social Council, whose mechanisms should guarantee independent decision-making and absolute equality of opportunities to all those who, through their investment, contribute to national development".

"Only the President of the Mozambican Republic, the Prime Minister of Mozambique and the President of Renamo, may, whenever they feel it necessary, ask for clarification and solicit information from the Economic and Social Council."

"The government of Mozambique should be responsible for providing all the human and material resources needed for the Council to start work, on 1 October 1993." Renamo's representatives on the Economic and Social Council shall be given status and

"Whenever the Economic and Social Council does not approve projects, the President of the Republic, Prime Minister and Renamo President should be informed." "In the case when a project is not approved, the petitioner may call for a summit of the two presidents". According to Renamo, this body would be permanent and would decide on investment in the areas of mining, energy, industrial fishing, forestry, tourism, banking, insurance and "other financial and credit institutions".

#### Proposal on the police

On the issue of police, the Renamo documents continue: Considering the will of both parties to fully respect the General Peace Accord and to achieve authentic peace in the country based on democratic principles and national reconciliation;

Considering the need to strengthen and speed the process of implementing the General Peace Accord, in particular to start, as soon as possible, the process of demobilising military personnel;

1 - The police force, during the period of transition and until a new government takes office, is subject to the Joint Supreme Command of the FADM [new, joint national army], which will superintend its activities;

2 - The Joint Supreme Command will work at central, provincial, district and locality level, through FADM regional commanders, periodically supplying information to the COMPOL;

3 - The Anti-Riot Police, the elite police force, should be dissolved on 1 October 1993, its members passing to the disposition of the FADM Supreme Command;

4 - All the equipment of the Anti-Riot Police should be listed and checked against information of the Ministry of Interior and handed over to the FADM Supreme Command, which assumes responsibility for looking after it;

5 - To ensure this is done effectively, the Ministry of Interior should provide the FADM Supreme Command with a list of all personnel, including rank and salary, who are part of the PRM [national police force] and of the Anti-Riot Police, the logistical and financial means available to them and their locality, for the whole country;

- An elite corps of the police should be created, named the "Intervention Police";

- It's creation, composition, functions and equipment should be defined by the FADM Joint Supreme Command, together with COMPOL;

- The commanders of the "Intervention Police" should be named by the FADM Joint Supreme Command, with a hearing for COMPOL;

- The activities of this elite force should be well justified and always ratified by COMPOL.

#### Calendar

#### AUGUST

 Frelimo officials say they are not prepared to negotiate Renamo demands to appoint provincial governors. on Renamo position at Mangole, Gaza province, which they threatened to avenge by "destroying Frelimo" was not actually a physical attack but a movement of government troops in the direction of their men.

- 21 Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama arrives on first post-war visit to Maputo
- 23 First meeting between Dhlakama and Chissano on Mozambican soil starts in Maputo.
- 25 Armed robbery attacks reported on Maputo-South Africa road.
- 27 Media reports say Dhlakama has withdrawn demands for Renamo provincial governors. Dhlakama says he is willing to integrate Renamo held zones in the State Administration.

#### SEPTEMBER

- 2 Chissano and Dhlakama announce a breakthrough in their talks designed to overcome the obstacles to implementing the peace process, namely through agreeing solutions to dispute over territorial administration and police control.
- 3 Chissano and Dhlakama sign formal agreement; Dhlakama leaves the capital.
- 6 UNHCR and South Africa sign accord which implicitly recognises refugee status of Mozambican refugees in South Africa (est. 300,000).
- 7 Renamo head of external relations, Jose De Castro, said Renamo and government were close to reaching agreement on disputed Article 16 of government's election bill.
- 10 Dhlakama said he will not apply "Frelimo constitution" in zones under Renamo control, before general elections, nor allow opposition parties to campaign there. This seems to contradict the 3 September agreement.
- 13 UN Security Council resolution; international community increasing pressure for elections no later than October 1994, suggesting funding to ONUMOZ and the peace process will end at then.
- 17 Multi-party Conference on election law abandoned, after eight unarmed opposition parties walk out and Renamo says it cannot discuss further. No results after over a month of talking.
- 20 UN Special Envoy Ajello presents government and Renamo with a new calendar for completing the peace process; it calls for demobilisation to start in Oct 1993 and for elections in Oct 1994.
- 21 Afonso Dhlakama met Kenya's President and announced he would make regional tour.
- 23 Chissano met US President Clinton, who reaffirmed his support for the democratic process. Interpreted to mean backing for elections rather than a unity or transitional government.
- 24 Renamo National Council says it wants elections in Oct 1994 and is ready to hold them before troops are demobilised -- a position promptly rejected by the Government. Chissano said some Renamo elements don't want to demobilise.