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Sluggish start to campaign

Official campaigning began 22 September for Mozambique's first multi-party elections 27-28 October. Both Frelimo presidential candidate Joaqium Chissano and Renamo presidential candidate Afonso Dhlakama started with whirlwind tours of the north involving several rallies a day, often drawing thousands of people. Chissano and the governing Frelimo party started off with a modest bang, with a series of shows including bands and parachutists, plus free plastic bags, t-shirts and capulanas (skirts).

In the first few days there was little more than a disorganised whimper from the remaining ten presidential candidates and 12 political groups standing for parliament. Some were not even able to use the television time allocated to them.

Posters and t-shirts for various parties began to appear in the cities, but it has been a low-key, lack-lustre campaign. Electioneering has been generally calm, although there have been about four incidents a day reported, most involving punch-ups and throwing stones at opposition candidates.

The lack of excitement is probably because this remains the election no one wants. People are

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afraid that, as in Angola, the election will mean the end of a welcome period of peace. Many will vote not for the candidate they think likely to govern best, but for the one who can maintain peace.

Although it is beginning to be talked about in the campaign, there remains a strong unwillingness to speak publicly about the war, and especially about the destruction and atrocities. There seems a sort of collective belief that to talk about the past will break the spell, and end the peace.

But worries continue about failures to satisfy the peace accord, and about threats, notably by Renamo.

Renamo threats

"I have already won. Only by electoral fraud can Frelimo and Chissano win the elections," declared Dhlakama in Ribaue on 7 October. This is a worrying echo of pre-election words by Jonas Savimbi in Angola.

Earlier, Dhlakama had said that Renamo would lose in Nampula, Zambezia and Inhambane provinces only if there were fraud. Even most Renamo supporters do not expect Dhlakama to win in Inhambane.

Speaking to the press in Nampula on 4 October, said that if there was fraud and he did lose the election, "we won't return to war but we won't recognise the result."

Dhlakama underlined the implied threat in this by stating several times in Nampula province in early October that Renamo could "paralyse the country in less than 24 hours".

Possible action was spelled out by *Imparcial*, a Maputo daily newsletter considered very close to Renamo. In its 23 September issue it wrote that "it is expected that the post election period will be tense,

according to declarations by well placed sources in Frelimo and Renamo.

"If Renamo loses the election it will opt for destabilisation, for a short or long period, to force the international community to put pressure on the democratically elected government to form a government of national unity or to guarantee posts in the government."

Imparcial goes on to say that after losing elections in Zimbabwe, "Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU resorted to destabilisation to win a place in government."

Would anyone object?

Will the loser accept the results?

"I am cautiously optimistic; I think the results will be accepted. There will be a loud condemnation of any party which refuses," US ambassador Dennis Jett told the BULLETIN. He stressed there will be enough international observers present to be able to decide if the election is free and fair, the US would not accept the rejection of a free and fair election.

But Jett also said that "Mozambicans can ensure that the outcome is accepted by reaching an agreement among themselves."

In practice, the international community has more leverage over Frelimo, he admits, because it can threaten to withdraw aid if Frelimo wins and fails to make a deal with Renamo. Indeed, Jett wrote to the World Bank suggesting the annual donors conference normally held in early December be postponed and not held until a new government is in place.

The UN and the international community cannot force the losing side to accept. "There is little the outside would can do. We were unable to do it in Liberia, Somalia or Angola," Jett said. The UN could not intervene to enforce the outcome because that would be "like taking sides in a civil war". Jett added: "If the UN won't attack forces committing genocide in Rwanda, it won't punish one side here."

Accord violations: Soldiers remain

Hidden Renamo soldiers, arms and radios were provoking concern in early October.

All fighters from both sides were supposed to be accounted for by 30 August and demobilised by mid-September. Yet in the first week of October, there were 606 Renamo soldiers who had only appeared in September and October asking for demobilisation, and more were still appearing.

Many were at locations repeatedly cited by the government as secret Renamo bases: Renamo's Maringue headquarters in Sofala, Dombe in Manica, Namanjavira in Zambezia and Sinjal in Tete.

According to sources in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), some had been told by their commanders to remain hidden and not to be demobilised, but they objected and wanted to obtain their demob payments.

Having previously told the United States government that demobilisation had long been completed, Dhlakama admitted on 27 September that there still existed hundred of armed Renamo fighters.

The government, too, reported that some people had not been listed and demobilised on time; ONUMOZ sources say all are non-combatants, mainly disabled soldiers and a few cooks and office workers. * Vincente Ululu, Renamo foreign secretary, told an AWEPA delegation of visiting MPs on 15 September that Renamo has some guerrillas who have only been "temporarily demobilised". They will be integrated into the new army after the election and are presently awaiting instructions from Renamo.

Hidden arms

Renamo continues to obstruct ONUMOZ efforts to identify Renamo arms caches. After the closure of the assembly areas, the Cease Fire Commission (CCF) was to do a verification mission which includes visits to all sites listed by the two sides as having been in military use. Most important are arms dumps where the two sides must list weapons stored; weapons are destroyed on the spot or taken under UN control.

The government listed 431 and by early October 336 had been visited without the teams finding a significant violation.

Renamo listed 294 of which only 85 had been visited, again without violation. But 168 were arms dumps for which Renamo only gave coordinates; 20 were visited but 18 were found to have inaccurate coordinates, while only two were actually found and they had no arms.

The matter was raised with the CCF, but Renamo boycotted the CCF from 22 September until 4 October, missing four meetings. Finally when the CCF resumed meeting on 4 October it was agreed that verification teams would only go with Renamo-provided guides. At the meeting on 10 October Renamo offered only 11 guides to show the ONUMOZ teams how to find the 168 arms depots. Angry ONUMOZ officials say that the boycott at a critical time caused serious delays and that it will now be impossible to visit all Renamo arms dumps before the election.

In another apparent violation of the peace accord, Renamo refused to hand over its military communication system, saying it was needed for the electoral campaign. The matter provoked increasingly strong protests from the government, and was even raised by Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi in a

meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutos-Ghali on 4 October in New York.

Renamo finally provided lists of 18 anbd 20 radios to CCF meetings on 4 and 10 October, but still refused to hand over the actual equipment.

Access stll restricted

Access is still restricted to some Renamo-controlled areas, particularly in Nampula and Sofala provinces, in another violation of the peace accord.

In Lunga in Nampula province, Frelimo was forced to close its new office and barred from holding rallies; other parties have also been unable to enter Renamo zones in Nampula.

In Namanjavira, a Radio Mozambique journalist and a government official were beaten by Renamo supporters for allegedly supporting Frelimo.

The government complained to the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) that although Renamo did allow Mozambican police to go into Renamo areas, they are not allowed to wear guns or uniforms, and three policemen were detained in Maringue for a month in August and September.

Inhaminga in Sofala province, the largest town controlled by Renamo during the war, remains under particularly tight Renamo rule. Hundreds of demobbed Renamo guerrillas have gone to Inhaminga, and they wander about the largely destroyed town in armed gangs, apparently encouraged by Renamo officials.

According to the local UN police (CivPol), the Mozambican police who opened up a police post in Inhaminga were forced to flee after threats from the armed gangs.

Election Commission workers told the BBC about their fear working in Inhaminga. One said: "there cannot be a free election here".

Renamo seized the only Election Commission vehicle in the district and refuses to return it, they said. Renamo officials shadow the Election Commission workers, and have openly threatened them in the presence of foreigners.

One election official said: "People here are not permitted a free choice; they cannot express a free opinion."

People have been told they are only allowed to vote for Renamo, and people who have expressed support for other parties have been beaten. Opposition parties have not been allowed to campaign in Inhaminga.

The election official added: "they say here that the war will start again if Dhlakama loses."

Campaign disruption

Frelimo supporters stoned Afonso Dhlakama's helicopter and motorcade and attacked other

opposition rallies. These are the most serious of incidents being reported at the rate of several a day.

In a campaign which has been overwhelingly peaceful, it is also apparent that there is a level of intolerance of the opposition being showed particularly, but not only, by Frelimo. Some complaints about "disruption" of meetings were really of heckling that would be acceptable elsewhere; others are more serious.

In Boane in Maputo province on 7 October, Frelimo supporters tried to disrupt a speech by PCN leader Lutero Simango and stoned his motorcade as he left, causing three injuries. When asked why they had tried to disrupt the meeting, the young people said they had been told to do so by the administrator.

Dhlakama's car was stoned in several places in Nampula province and his helicopter was stoned and damaged in Mogovolas, also in Nampula. In Chokwe in Gaza a march by Renamo supporters was stoned.

There have been several punch-ups between supporters of opposing parties. In Ribaue in Nampula, Frelimo supporters tried to disrupt a Renamo meeting, and Renamo supporters in retaliation sacked the Frelimo office.

In some areas, Frelimo has apparently told its supporters to boycott opposition meetings, or to yell and wave posters to disrupt them.

Few formal complaints

By 10 October only three formal complaints had been submitted to the National Elections Commission, all against Frelimo.

Observers are concerned by indictions of a plan, on both sides, to store up complaints against each other and only announce them after the elections, in order to cast doubt on the fairness of results.

The independent weekly Savana reported that "Renamo sources revealed that Renamo's strategy is to accumulate as many incidents caused by Frelimo as possible so that later, probably after election results have been announced, they can present them as proof that the elections were not free, that there was intimidation and violence."

Of the three formal complaints, one was about an incident on the opening day of the campaign when a member of the AP was allegedly beaten by Frelimo supporters at a rally.

Another was a complaint by the UD that an official was told by Frelimo that if she did not leave Inhaca within 24 hours she would be dead.

The third is by PCN and concerns a stoning in Maputo on 1 October. All three were forwarded to the police on the grounds that violence and threats are criminal offenses, not electoral ones.

Pre-election deals: No agreement

Presidential candidates Chissano and Dhlakama failed to reach a pre-election deal, despite at least two meetings -- one lasting more than 10 hours -- in the week before the campaign started in September.

Dhlakama had demanded that if he lost the election, he wanted a special status for the opposition, the right to name governors in provinces where Renamo won a majority, and the status of vice president for himself. The first demand has been accepted, but the second and third were rejected.

Chissano returned from the first leg of his campaign tour around northern Mozambique with his confidence swollen by the large crowds, and gave a press conference on 5 October taking a hard stance.

Chissao said he would give a recognised status to the "Leader of the Opposition", complete with salary, benefits, and special protocol treatment. He also said he would give special treatment to Dhlakama even if he did not come second in the vote. "We can consider Dhlakama a special case; not that he should be rewarded for waging war, but he needs time to calm his nerves".

But he rejected suggestions that Dhlakama be made a vice-president and that provincial governors be appointed by the party that gains the largest vote in the province. Both, he said, would require constitutional changes -- the president appoints governors and there is no post of vice president -- and that Chissano and Dhlakama could not simply make a deal between themselves.

How much is needed?

"Naturally, Dhlakama would like more," Chissano admitted to the press conference. And Western diplomats in Maputo said they hoped that post-elections, Chissano would improve the deal by offering leading posts to Dhlakama and some of his top officials, probably depending on the size of support they gained in elections.

Diplomats argue that if Chissano is pragmatic enough to make them a comfortable offer, Renamo's leaders would accept. Their military capacity had been dissipated and their rear bases of support (in South Africa and Malawi) has been eroded by political change. Meanwhile, since Dhlakama and his top aides came to Maputo last year, an enormous distance has grown between their increasingly comfortable city life, and that of their poverty-stricken ex-guerrilla fighters still languishing in the bush.

Even provincial Renamo delegates have bitterly complained that Renamo leaders spent all the \$12 million UN Trust Fund money on a good life in the

capital. For his part, Dhlakama obviously enjoys his new found-role as populist politician; he is still young, and if he managed to play a successful part as Leader of the Opposition, he could stand a good chance at the next elections in five years time.

No to GUN

Chissano reiterated Frelimo's long-standing rejection of pressure from Dhlakama and the US, Portugal and Britain for a pre-elections deal to form a South Africa-style Government of National Unity (GUN).

Chissano said "the international community lauds me, praises me and claps me on the back, so that I will go in the direction it wants me to go". In an interview with the Sunday newspaper *Domingo*, he said: "During the Rome negotiations we made many concessions, but whenever we tried to get Renamo to concede they said we should be more generous, since we were in power. Now, on the eve of elections, they tell me if I accept a GUN I will be the most admired man in the world. But what's the point in being admired, when the people's role is reduced to zero?

"And I would be politically reduced to zero. It would not be the first time; the whole world applauded him, but where is Gorbachev now?".

He repeated that he was not prepared to accept any opposition parties within the government, where "they could continue to blackmail us".

But Chissano and Foreign Minister Mocumbi have repeatedly said if Frelimo wins the election, it will include members of other parties in the government. But Chissano said this would only happen "if they agree to participate on the basis of accepting the programme of my party and accepting the discipline of my government, and not the discipline of the party they may belong to."

With hindsight, some western diplomats in Maputo now suggest the heavy pressure on Chissano and Frelimo for a GUN was unwise. It clearly misfired, because Chissano was forced to reject any deal.

Only at a very late stage, with the campaign already underway, did the international community return to the earlier suggestion about defining and strengthening the role of a parliamentary opposition.

Elections: Few predictions

Few observers are willing to forecast the election outcome. However, a general feeling is that few, if any, of the 12 small parties and coalitions will obtain the 5% of the national vote required to elect MPs, leaving only Frelimo and Renamo in parliament.

Both Chissano and Dhlakama have been drawing

large crowds, but journalists report that many are simply curious, bored, attracted by free t-shirts and plastic bags, or drawn by Frelimo's big shows; crowd size may be a poor indication of voting intention.

President Joaquim Chissano seems more likely to be re-elected president, and the diplomatic community argues that Dhlakama's pressure for a deal suggests that he, too, feels Chissano will win. But Chissano told his 5 October press conference that "no one can predict the result of an election," and he cited the last British election in which Labour failed to win despite being ahead in the polls.

There are 10 other presidential candidates in the race, each of whom will gain some votes, so it is unclear if Chissano will achieve the 50% needed to win on the first ballot, or if the National Elections Commission will have to call a second round between the leading rivals. The second round must take place between 7 and 21 days after the publication of the results, which means before 10 December.

Biggest show

Joaquim Chissano launched his bid for re-election with rallies punctuated by popular music by leading pop stars, singing, dancing and parachutists dropped spectacularly into the waiting crowds. Free t-shirts and capulanas were had by all. In a mix of languages, the rallies were billed as "showmicios" -- a combination of "show" in English and "comicio" meaning "rally" in Portuguese.

Chissano's campaign tour was planned well in advance with the help of a Brazilian public relations company and other foreign advisors. It stood out from the other political campaigns as the most flamboyant and best organised.

Chissano presents himself as the man who achieved a Peace Accord to end war with Renamo, while many of his presidential rivals had fled the country. "They fled to exile in Portugal and waited for me to bring peace. Now they come back and claim that they are the democrats."

He ridiculed Renamo's claim to have forced him into democracy. In a harsh rally address on Ilha de Mocambique, a northern island said to be pro-Renamo, Chissano said: "When we talk of Renamo, we are talking of women raped, and others with their bellies ripped open," referring to crimes Renamo committed in 16 years civil war.

In Marromeu, he said that the real cause of economic problems was not mismanagement but that Renamo had destroyed the local sugar mill and other industries. Renamo destruction had prevented Frelimo efforts to develop the country, he said.

Frelimo promises reconciliation, reconstruction and renewal -- starting from within the government itself. Chissano notes that 85% of Frelimo's candidates for

the new parliament are new names, now representing a broad cross-section of ethnic, regional, social, religious and economic groups.

Frelimo advantages

The party in power always has an advantage in an election. Chissano can open new roads and radio transmitters as president, showing what the governing party has done.

And despite its quest for new blood, almost all the Frelimo government's ministers are on the parliamentary candidates lists, and their well-known names could help the propaganda drive.

But there is also concern that Frelimo may by going too far in using its advantage, and that some government officials are not distinguishing between Chissano the president and Chissano the candidate.

Savana reported that in the Zambezia district of Morrumbala, the district administrator ordered all public offices to close on the day Chissano held a rally, and in violation of the law, he even ordered shut the District Elections Commission, legally bound to be neutral in the elections.

The other giant

Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama is campaigning as the bringer of democracy to Mozambique. He says Frelimo's bad polices and misgovernment were responsible for the nation's ills.

In his rallies in Zambezia and Nampula, where he focused the first two weeks of his campaign, Dhlakama appealed heavily to tribalist and regionalist emotions, and called for the muslim vote.

Nampula is the most populous province and will elect more than one-fifth of all MPs. Nampula and its Macua ethic group have historically been marginalised; Frelimo's one party government had only one Macua minister. Dhlakama followed hot on Chissano's heels in Nampula with a wide-ranging tour of the districts, and made an overtly ethic pitch for Macua support.

Dhlakama accused Frelimo of despising the north, neglecting its people and disrespecting its religious communities. He promised to right those wrongs by decentralising local government and appointing local people to local posts.

Before the start of formal campaigning, Renamo seemed better organised on the ground than Frelimo. But this did not continue into the campaign itself.

When Chissano announced the launch of his campaign in Nampula city, Dhlakama quickly changed his plan of starting from the same venue and pitched up, instead, several hours late, to address a rally in Quelimane. He said Zambezia should be re-named "Renamo Province" because of its support.

Meanwhile Renamo provincial delegates waited for further instructions and more money before putting their own shows on the road. The Renamo head in Nampula, Carvalho Pensado, said one day before the campaign: "We are ready to start at any moment -- though we don't have a programme. How could we organise one, with no money?"

More money

Renamo started campaigning only after a successful last minute threat to boycott the race unless the international community immediately coughed up another \$5 million to the finance the campaign.

The US government quickly came through with the \$1 million it had promised Dhlakama in June for the UN-managed Trust Fund to "help Renamo's transition from a guerrilla movement into a political party".

Denmark put another \$500,000 in the Trust Fund; \$1.5 million is expected from the European Union. Italy promised to take \$3 million from humanitarian assistance and instead give it to Renamo.

The pipsqueaks

Especially in the first few days, the two political giants dominated the campaign. The rest of the opposition seemed to be taken almost unaware.

They blamed lack of funds and inadequate information, but what really shone through was a lack of preparedness and experience of most opposition candidates. On the first day of the campaign, national television fell silent for many minutes, as candidates failed to make use of their legally-guaranteed party political airtime.

The smaller opposition parties did face an initial media imbalance. The British group Article 19 (The International Centre Against Censorship) is analyzing media coverage of the campaign. It summed up reporting on the first week of campaigning by saying "Frelimo and its candidates always occupy first place in the news and reports on national radio. The other parties are always relegated to the 'meanwhiles'."

In week two, the situation changed, with Frelimo no longer grabbing the first headline of every report.

Calm prevails

Despite the incidents of stone-throwing and punchups at rallies, the campaign has been reasonably trouble free. This is perhaps best typified by rallies on the Ilha de Mocambique. At a Chissano rally two men holding up Dhlakama posters were not harassed and even were able to distribute leaflets after the rally.

When Dhlakama held his rally there, Renamo sympathisers beat up a man wearing a Frelimo t-shirt

and ripped the shirt to shreds. Dhlakama intervened and said nstead of destroying t-shirts, people should accept such offers from the ruling party because they were purchased with money stolen from the people. * Although Chissano has increasingly talked of Renamo atrocities during the war, Frelimo has yet to identify individuals it blames for massacres. Similarly, Renamo talks in general about corruption but has not pointed the finger at individuals. It is unclear if this is

an understood form of mutual restraint, or if the mud

Registration figures

will start to fly later in the campaign.

Final registration figures announced by the National Elections Commission (CNE) are slightly higher than published in BULLETIN 11, leading to the reallocation of one parliamentary seat. The revised totals are:

| Province | Seats | Registration |
|---------------------------|-------|--------------|
| TOTAL | 250 | 6,396,061 |
| Maputo city | 18 | 459,166 |
| Maputo prov. | 13 | 330,887 |
| Gaza | 16 | 398,381 |
| Inha mban e | 18 | 471,524 |
| Sofala | 21 | 530,066 |
| Manica | 13 | 322,201 |
| Tete | 15 | 397,260 |
| Zambezia | 50 | 1,270,098 |
| Nampula | 53 | 1,365,796 |
| Niassa | 11 | 282,513 |
| C. Delgado | 22 | 568,169 |
| | | |

2571 candidates

The 12 parties and 2 coalitions submitted lists containing 3117 candidates to the CNE. Of those, 542 were rejected by the CNE because they were on more than one list, had not submitted a voters card number, or had failed to turn in the official report showing they have no criminal record.

PT was the best organised, losing only 3 of 226 candidates; Unamo and Sol both lost one-third of their prospective candidates.

Renamo appealed and the Electoral Tribunal reinstated four of its candidates who had been excluded on the grounds of not showing they did not have a criminal record. The Tribunal accepted Renamo's argument that the Rome peace accord gives it a special status with respect to political crimes which means its candidates do not have to show they do not have a criminal record.

The Tribunal has made only one other ruling, upholding the CNE's rejection of the presidential candidature of Neves Serrano for failing to submit proper documentation.

Demobbed threaten

AMODEG, the Mozambican Association of Demobilised Soldiers of both Renamo and the government, has threatened to disrupt the elections if the government and donors do not announce an improved programme for the demobbed by 20 October. In particular, they are demanding jobs.

Julio Nimuire, AMODEG president, said "we won't kill anyone or burn cars. We will just go to the polling stations and prevent voting." Nimuire says he knows that the international community will not be interested in demobbed soldiers after the election, so AMODEG must act before the election.

Although demobbed soldiers receive an income for two years, there are growing complaints that this is not sufficient to reintegrate them into civilian life. Mozambique is a very poor country and there are no jobs and few training opportunities for the 75,000 demobbed soldiers. Yet many demobbed soldiers see themselves as state employees who had been promised a job until retirement, and they object to being returned to a lower status as a peasant.

Indeed, many of the demobbed feel they have been promised more. The booklet given to each demobbed soldier by the Reintegration Commission (Core) says that at district level "you will have special programmes and support" including seeds and tools, emergency food, "access to work and training possibilities", and "access to arable land".

But district administrators say they have been given no means to provide any of this.

Renamo admin boycott

Renamo has been boycotting the Territorial Administration Commission since July. The Commission is supposed to establish which zones are under Renamo control and approve Renamo-named administrators for them. The Commission has Renamo and government co-chairs, and cannot take action without both being present. But Renamo co-chair Francisco Rupansana has not attended a meeting since July, and has not communicated with the Commission -- whose work has ground to a halt.

Before work stopped, the Commission had agreed that five districts and 42 administrative posts were Renamo controlled: Niassa, Mavago district and 7 posts; Cabo Delgado, 1 post; Nampula, 2 posts; Tete, 12 posts; Zambezia, 3 posts; Manica, Macossa district and 7 posts; Sofala, Cheringoma, Muanza and Maringue districts and 8 posts; and Gaza, 2 posts.

Since then administrators have been agreed for all of these, and some are in place. Five disputes remain unsettled because of the boycott: Namaponda post in Nampula which was occupied by Renamo after 4 October, Chigubu district in Gaza where there is

disagreement about which town is district capital, and three posts in southern Maputo province.

In addition, Renamo has proposed people for lower level jobs in the administrative posts and districts it controls in four provinces, but nothing has been done about this because of the boycott.

In brief

- * The commander of UN police in Mozambique, Titos Xavier, is said by *Domingo* to be the Portuguese army commander who ordered the Mueda massacre 34 years ago. A major historic event here, 600 people were killed and the massacre provoked the start of the liberation war against Portugal. *Domingo* comments: "It is one of the ironies of history that the UN thinks the massacre of Mueda is sufficient training to maintain order at election time."
- * In the first five weeks of the verification process, the Cease Fire Commission (CCF) found 130 unreported arms caches. Some were very large, involving truckloads of arms. Others may have been guite old, dating back to the liberation war.
- * The 75 officers of the new joint army who come from Renamo went on strike in early October. They are all staying in the Hotel Turismo in Maputo, and they are demanding houses and cars similar to those their ex-government counterparts have retained.

Comment:

Money well spent?

The two year Mozambican peace process has cost nearly \$1 billion. But is it money well spent? Would it have been more profitable to give the money to Mozambique than to spend it on thousands of UN soldiers and bureaucrats? \$1 bn is \$65 for every woman, man and child in Mozambique. What would have happened if they had been given the money?

Dhlakama has repeatedly delayed the process to gain only \$15 mn. Government generals slowed the process to get a bit of extra money. Demobbed soldiers blocked roads to demand more. Would the process have gone more smoothly if the money was handed out to Mozambicans directly?

If \$1 bn had been put on the table at the Rome peace conference, a deal might have been rapid: say \$10 mn each for the two presidents, \$1 mn each for the 50 top individuals on each side, and \$5000 for every soldier. That would take \$700 mn, leaving \$100 mn for an election (if anyone wanted one) and \$200 mn to start rebuilding the country.

Post-election schedule

The election is scheduled to take place 27 and 28 October. The CNE has the right to extend voting for a third day, which would make all last dates one day later.

| Event | Must occur before | Last possible date | | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|--|--|--|
| Results to district | 24 hours after close | 29 Oct | | | |
| Results to province | 48 hours after close | 30 Oct | | | |
| Announce provincial results | 7 days after close | 4 Nov | | | |
| Announce national result | 15 days from close | 12 Nov | | | |
| Publish national result | 7 days from announcement | 19 Nov | | | |
| MPs sworn in | 15 days after publication | 4 Dec | | | |
| President sworn in | 8 days after MPs sworn in | 12 Dec | | | |

If there is a second presidential round

Announce date 5 days after result publication 24 Nov Second ballot 7-21 days after publication 10 Dec

Parliamentary candidates by parties

| Party | Nur | nber of | Candi | dates | | | | | | | | . | 5 |
|---------------------|-------------|---------|-------|-------|----|-------------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|----------|--------------------|
| | Cabo Del | Gaza | Inh | Man | | Map Prov | Nam | Nia | Sof | Tete | Zam | Total | Rejected by CNE |
| Seats in parliament | 22 | 16 | 18 | 13 | 18 | 13 | 53 | 11 | 21 | 15 | 50 | 250 | |
| Frelimo | 32 | 26 | 28 | 20 | 28 | 22 | 61 | 20 | 28 | 22 | 55 | 343 | 9 |
| Renamo | 32 | 17 | 28 | 22 | 28 | 23 | 62 | 21 | 28 | 21 | 59 | 341 | 11 |
| AP | 11 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 29 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 24 | 117 | 27 |
| FUMO | 8 | 17 | 24 | 1 | 27 | 12 | 34 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 16 | 147 | 20 |
| PACODE | 6 | 11 | 4 | 11 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 12 | 19 | 14 | 92 | 35 |
| PADEMO | 1 | - | 18 | 10 | 2 | - | 48 | 5 | - | 5 | 11 | 100 | 18 |
| PCN | 13 | 3 | 9 | 12 | 7 | 8 | 38 | 4 | 22 | 10 | 35 | 161 | 51 |
| PIMO | 25 | 2 | 16 | 7 | 8 | 12 | 42 | 1 | 3 | 11 | 20 | 147 | 26 |
| PPPM | 14 | 13 | 11 | 9 | 19 | 10 | 40 | 9 | 15 | 7 | 29 | 178 | 74 |
| PRD | 25 | - | 7 | 12 | 15 | 14 | 62 | 6 | 6 | - | 8 | 161 | 53 |
| PT | - | 20 | 24 | 14 | 23 | 15 | 38 | 9 | 21 | 19 | 40 | 223 | 3 |
| SOL | 25 | 15 | 14 | 12 | 19 | 14 | 39 | 9 | 21 | 1 | 25 | 192 | 86 |
| UD | 21 | 16 | 20 | 12 | 21 | 15 | 43 | 6 | 21 | 12 | 48 | 235 | 49 |
| UNAMO | 22 | 1 | 12 | 5 | 12 | 13 | 60 | 1 | - | 4 | 17 | 148 | 76 |

- = no candidates

AP = MONAMO + FAP UD = PALMO + PANADE + PANAMO