

MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

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Venancio Mondlane charged with inciting terrorism; 4 minor opposition figures accused of conspiracy

Venancio Mondlane was charged on Tuesday 22 July for inciting and instigating terrorism, condoning and inciting crime, and incitement to collective disobedience. The evidence in the 40-page indictment is largely from his public Facebook broadcasts. He is accused of provoking 'a state of fear and terror in order to subsequently alter and subvert the rule of law, through the dissemination of radical ideas'. It alleges he 'acted to instigate violence and social upheaval'. (Carta de Moçambique, AIM 23 July)

The indictment makes no mention that peaceful protests were in response to fraudulent elections or to the public assassination of two of Mondlane's assistants on 19 October, nor to the 350 demonstrators shot and killed by police.

In a separate prosecution on 21 July, four opposition figures and two soldiers were charged with conspiring against the security of the state. (*Carta de Moçambique*, AIM 21 July) One of those charged is Vitano Singano, leader of the Democratic Revolution (RD) party, which is a breakaway from Renamo. But his whereabouts are unknown because he was kidnapped by armed people in Beira on 2 July. The party and Singano's family say that he was kidnapped by the National Criminal Investigation Service (Sernic), an accusation that Sernic denies.

Also charged is Manecas Daniel, the coordinator of the Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD) and two other CAD figures, Reinaldo Sindique and Justino Monjane. The other two men charged are members of the armed forces, Jeremias Siteo and Piedade Machado. They are charged with conspiracy to commit a crime against state security, in a 16 page charge sheet. Siteo appears only to be charged for his WhatsApp posts, supposedly to recruit young people for violent demonstrations. Singano is accused of being the organiser and of recruiting military personnel. The charge is partly based on telephone conversations plus meetings in Alto Mae, Maputo, in October 2024,

The CAD is a coalition of tiny opposition parties. Last year Venancio Mondlane was standing as CAD presidential candidate and a CAD parliamentary candidate. After the closing date for candidate registration, the National Elections Commission suddenly decided that it should never had registered CAD as a coalition, and cancelled its registration. In the electoral process, reversing a previous decision like that is totally illegal. But suddenly Mondlane could not stand for parliament. An idiosyncrasy of Mozambique electoral law is that, formally, all presidential candidates stand as

independents. So Mondlane would still stand and linked his candidacy to Podemos. He became the main opposition candidate and Podemos the main opposition party in parliament. But the election was so fraudulent, it is impossible to know who actually won.

The war is intensifying:

Cabo Delgado governor's convoy stopped in Mueda by demonstrators demanding protection

Since the end of the rainy season in April, the civil war in Cabo Delgado has intensified and spread. OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) said May saw the 'sharpest rise in violence in Cabo Delgado since June 2022'. (Mozambique Access Snapshot as of 31 May) In just one week, 16-23 July, more than 15 insurgent 'incidents' were reported in each of five districts: Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Macomia, Meluco, and Ancuabe. (Focus Group *Mozambique Weekly*, 16-23 July)

The big change was insurgents taking control of the only paved north-south road, the N380. Cabo Delgado business association (CTA) head Mamudo Irache said 104 vehicles had been intercepted and the fee for release is between \$3000 and \$5000. With no money, your vehicle is burned, he said. On 12 July, insurgents captured a passenger vehicle traveling from Pemba to Nangade, taking money, phones, and other goods. All hostages were released by the end of the day, except for two teachers from Nangade as their ransoms had not been paid. The teachers were later released after \$860 was paid.

Irache demanded that the military convoy be reintroduced on the N380 from Macomia district town 100 km north to Awasse/Ouasse. Almost all travel from Mueda goes along the N380. On Friday 18 July the Mueda branch of CTA announced a business and transport strike would start on Monday 21 July if there was no action. The strike began, and on Tuesday 22 Cabo Delgado, Cabo Delgado governor Valige Tauabo made an emergency visit to Mueda. As he arrived, his cars were stopped by a large demonstration. After a meeting with businesspeople, Tauabo conceded and the military protection of convoys began the next day, Wednesday 23 July.

At the meeting, business people also complained to Tauabo about the military creating multiple roadblocks on other roads and collecting "tolls".

Insurgent control of the N380 and the anger in the Frelimo "capital" of Mueda, shows how much the civil war has intensified.

Renegotiating megaprojects to increase Mozambique benefit

'We have contracts that are ending. This is a golden era and we believe that we need to find other ways to renegotiate some clauses that can benefit the Mozambican people,' said President Daniel Chapo on 22 June. (*O Pais*, 24 June) Chapo cited TRAC which has the contract for the toll road between Maputo and Ressano Garcia, and the megaproject Kenmare heavy sands. Mozal aluminium is also being renegotiated.

The megaprojects were negotiated in the 1990s and under IMF and World Bank pressure gave most of the benefits to the foreign investors and little to Mozambique, allegedly to encourage foreign investment. Each of the three public renegotiations is different.

Mozal uses Cahora Bassa electricity to smelt imported alumina into aluminium. It was funded by the World Bank International Finance Corporation, and thus was seen as aid. Mozal has industrial free zone status and pays no tax on profits, no customs duties, and no sales tax or VAT. It pays only a royalty of 1% of gross revenues from aluminium sales, so Mozambique gains very little. The colonial history means the main Cahora Bassa direct current (DC) transmission cable only goes to South Africa, which now has the contract for two thirds of Cahora Bassa electricity, so Mozal has to

buy the electricity back from South Africa. Mozal's contract for electricity runs out in 2026 and the Eskom South Africa's contract runs out in 2030, Chapo said on 23 June.

Changes to EU regulations mean taxes on products produced with fossil fuels are higher, which makes EU-tax-free Cahora Bassa electricity more valuable. Without green electricity, Mozal aluminium would be too expensive to sell in Europe. So the negotiation is over the electricity price. Chapo has already said Mozal will have to buy electricity directly from the state electricity company EDM. The negotiating advantage of the Mozambique government is that green electricity will have ready buyers from other energy intensive industries and Eskom. Mozal's owner on 14 July announced an 'impairment' to Mozal, meaning it is worth less, because Mozal has not been able to secure affordable power prices after March 2026. Owner South32's share price fell 7%.

Kenmare digs up beaches in Moma, Nampula, for titanium sands. It produces 6% of global titanium feedstocks. Kenmare is in a free zone but pays the government a 3% royalty on the sale of heavy mineral concentrate which it sells to its own processing company and then pays a 1% royalty on processed titanium, zircon, and other minerals it sells. Tax and royalties paid to government in 2024 were \$20mn. Kenmare is an Irish company and the Irish accounting regulator in March issued a highly critical report on the way the company is valued, and pointed out major flaws in Kenmare's handling of environmental risks and climate change.

Kenmare's mineral processing licence expired at the end of December 2024, but it has been allowed to continue operating. *Savana* reports that Kenmare offered to increase the current 1% processing royalty to 2.5%, but the government wants 4-5%. There has been a takeover battle for Kenmare, which turned down an offer from the company's founder to buy Kenmare for \$473mn. Thus Mozambique negotiates from a strong position because it knows another company would take over the mine if the licence is not renewed.

TRAC (Trans Africa Concessions) built and operates the 100km N4 toll road from Maputo to the South African border, but its 30 year concession expires in 2027. The 3 June Council of Ministers meet approved the setting up a technical team to consider alternatives after 2027. The ownership of TRAC is secret, but clearly includes people who were senior in the ANC and Frelimo 30 years ago and are still powerful.

Zimbabwe shows what is possible

Zimbabwe is already Africa's largest exporter of battery-grade lithium, and Chinese companies have invested \$1billion in lithium mines there. In 2022 Zimbabwe banned the export of lithium ore, and the Chinese companies now export lithium concentrate. Zimbabwe on 11 June announced a ban on lithium concentrate exports. This was after discussions with the Chinese companies, which are already building plants to take the next processing step, producing lithium sulfate.

Zimbabwe's approach of forcing processing, moving closer to battery-making, is working and creating jobs and exports. Why does Mozambique not do the same things with its graphite and other minerals?

Will gas negotiations finish next month?

Both TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanne and President Daniel Chapo are saying that the final set of negotiations will take place next month and work on Afungi and the gas project will resume in September. The biggest change is the both side agree the insurgency will continue and Mozambican troops cannot protect the site. After a meeting of the two, Chapo issued a statement on 21 July saying: "While the region is more stable than four years ago, it is not paradise." But the operation can resume. Pouyanne wants a fortress with no land access and protected by Rwandans. That still must be agreed and organised. Also to be settled is how much Mozambique pays for the costs of the 4-year delay. But both sides seem confident of a settlement.

Better negotiations may be due to a new team in Chapo's office in Maputo. They are João Osvaldo Moisés Machatine, director of the new Office for Reforms and Strategic Projects, which is responsible for renegotiating the megaprojects as well as new investment. He was minister of public works under ex-president Filipe Nyusi. Ricardo Sengo is civil minister in the presidency (casa civil) and previously worked with Standard Bank and KPMG. (*Africa Intelligence*, 22 July) Both have been in the meetings with Pouyanne, and it appears that Chapo and the two trusted associates now have taken control of gas. Ministers and the heads of the state energy companies have lost power.

'Ministro na Presidência para Assuntos da Casa Civil' is a Portuguese concept and is effectively head of the Presidência. https://presidencia.gov.mz/?page_id=464 This minister serves as a contact point and coordinator for other ministers, for senior Frelimo party figures, and for other influential people. Thus Sengo, as gatekeeper, is probably the most important minister in government. As Mozambique has become an oligarch state, the Minister for the Casa Civil is usually a Frelimo business person who also serves as contact point for the Frelimo oligarchs.

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"Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, number XXX", DATE, bit.ly/Mozamb, accessed XXX.

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Important external links

Books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks>

Flood, cyclone and weather: weather <https://www.inam.gov.mz/>

rainfall https://www.inam.gov.mz/images/DAPT_Previsoes/Manha/Previsao_Manha.pdf

Daily flood and monthly dry season reports - <https://bit.ly/Moz-Flood-2024>

Cyclone trackers, <https://bit.ly/Reunion-cyclone>, <https://www.metoc.navy.mil/jtwc/jtwc.html>

(which uses z time which is UCT - Coordinated Universal Time) and <https://www.cyclocane.com/>

Two LSE working papers - World Bank questions its Mozambique 'success' where oligarchs brought high inequality, poverty and corruption - <https://bit.ly/Moz-LSE-208c> and **How the IMF and World Bank caused a resource curse and civil war in Mozambique** - <https://bit.ly/Moz-LSE-209>

Minimum wage & exchange rate charts, tables 1996-2022 <https://bit.ly/MozMinWage2022>

Previous editions of this newsletter: <https://bit.ly/MozNews2023> and <https://bit.ly/MozNews2022>

My Mozambique archive: <http://bit.ly/Mozamb>

Cabo Delgado

Cabo Ligado weekly report on civil war <https://www.caboligado.com/>

Archive with reports, detailed maps, and census data <https://bit.ly/Moz-CDg>

Special reports on the war

Evolution of the war: global vs local. 27 Feb 2020 <http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins>

Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war. 30 April 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>

Intensifying argument over roots of war. 28 June 2020 <https://bit.ly/Moz-492>

Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace? 26 July 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-496>

A history of violence presages the insurgency. 13 August 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-498>

Military & economic intervention. 3 Sept 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene>

Cabo-Delgado-Free-for-all. 20 Apr 2022. <http://bit.ly/Moz-593>

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - 2018 - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - CIP- 2018 - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article- *Metical* - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

Gas for development?

Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasEng

Gás_para_desenvolvimento_ou_apenas_dinheiro?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasPt

Background reading

Special reports

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

\$2bn secret debt - in English

Secret debt trial (Aug-Oct 2021) press reports <https://bit.ly/Moz-secret-debt>

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Eleven books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks>

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013) <https://bit.ly/Zim-takes-land>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014) is on <https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer>

Há Mais Bicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Civil War Civil Peace (2006): <https://bit.ly/Civil-War-Civil-Peace>

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996) <https://bit.ly/Peace-wo-Profit>

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991) <https://bit.ly/Shots-Moz>

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

Mozambique media websites, English:

Club of Mozambique (free): <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar (paywall): <http://zitamar.com/>

Mozambique media websites, Portuguese (all with partial paywall):

Notícias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz

O País: www.opais.co.mz

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com>

Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:

Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP <https://cipmoz.org/>

Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR <https://omrmz.org/>

Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE <https://www.iese.ac.mz/>

Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento CDD <https://cddmoz.org/> (some CDD in English)

Also CDD now controls Fórum de Monitoria do Orçamento - FMO (main debt group) <http://www.fmo.org.mz>
and RMDDH - Rede Moçambicana dos Defensores dos Direitos Humanos (a human rights group).

To subscribe to all CDD publications: <http://eepurl.com/qO9l6v> (English or Portuguese).

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